Military Coalitions and the Politics of Information. When can diplomatic communication facilitate military cooperation? I … Expand. How can states signal their alliance commitments?
Although scholars have developed sophisticated theoretical models of costly signaling in international relations, we know little about which specific … Expand. Do Alliances Deter Aggression? Scholars have long debated the effects of military alliances on the likelihood of war, and no clear support has emerged for the argument that alliances improve the prospects for peace through … Expand.
The cost of security. It is well recognized that military alliances can provide their members with important security benefits. However, less attention has been paid to the policy concessions states must grant others to … Expand.
International reputation and alliance portfolios: How unreliability affects the structure and composition of alliance treaties. Why do states ever form military alliances with unreliable partners? States sign offensive and defensive military alliances to increase their fighting capabilities in the event of war and as a signal … Expand. The great asymmetry : America's closest allies in times of war. This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies.
It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two … Expand. To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances. Abstract Creating institutions that effectively manage interstate conflict is a priority for policy-makers. In this article we demonstrate that military allies are well positioned to influence the … Expand.
View 1 excerpt. Our paper examines the question of when conflicts expand and what leads particular states to join more quickly than others.
Using factors highlighted in the conflict expansion and joining … Expand. Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs. Alliances are not perfectly credible. The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later. Citations per year. Duplicate citations. The following articles are merged in Scholar.
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Interesting Argument and Its Critics. Signaling and Formality. Morrow argues that an alliance matters only under two conditions: a if the alliance impacts the calculation of the allies to come to the aid of one another during a war, and b if it leads adversaries to determine that the allies will fight to support one another.
Signaling information involves with the second condition; making commitment has to do with the first condition. Morrow provides two sources of these costs: coordinating its own foreign policy reducing autonomy, and pre-war military coordination.
Because states outside an alliance think that if allies coordinate their foreign policies, then they bear a sort of costs to build this similarity, such coordination makes the alliance more credible and thus enhance its deterrent effect.
In this case, peacetime coordination makes costs and the alliance more credible. However, several questions arise. For starters, do formal military alliances always lead extensive military coordination? However, it is a testable hypothesis, not an axiomatic empirical law. It is also possible that states do not fulfill their commitment to perform peaceful coordination. Furthermore, are these costs imposed by coordinating foreign policies and military force really bigger than the costs of intervening in an undesirable war?
If shared interests which lie behind formal alliance vanish, then the costs of fulfilling alliance commitment may sharply increase. Even under this circumstance, formal alliance may remain intact because breaking formal agreement is costly, especially when no several conflicts occur. Therefore, assuming that the costs made by forming formal alliance are always bigger than the costs of being entrapped into a war is not compelling.
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